We explore the impact of vertical specialization -trade in goods across multiple stages of production -on the relationship between trade and business cycle synchronization across countries. We develop an international business cycle model in which the degree of vertical specialization varies with trade barriers. With perfect competition, we show analytically that fluctuations in measured total factor productivity are not linked across countries through trade. In numerical simulations, we find little dependence of business cycle synchronization on trade intensity. An extension of the model to allow for imperfect competition has the potential to resolve these shortcomings.
I. Introduction
In recent empirical work, several authors have documented a link between international trade and cross-country business cycle synchronization. Frankel & Rose (1998) established that country pairs that trade more exhibit on average higher correlations in their business cycles, as measured by ‡uctuations in GDP.
1 However, Kose & Yi (2001) and (2006) have illustrated what they call a trade-comovement puzzle: standard international real business cycle models along the lines of Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1994) cannot quantitatively account for the relationship between trade and business cycle comovement.
In this paper, we develop an international business cycle model augmented with vertical specialization -i.e., the production of goods in multiple stages spread across countries -and quantitatively assess its ability to generate stronger business cycle synchronization between countries that trade more. In addressing the empirical facts behind the trade-comovement puzzle, several authors have suggested that it is not only the volume of trade, but particular features of specialization patterns and industrial structure associated with increased trade that lead to business cycle synchronization. Frankel & Rose (1998) conjectured that intra-industry trade tends to make countries more correlated, while Kose & Yi (2001) have suggested that vertical specialization may be the key linkage that synchronizes business cycles of countries with close trade relationships. The intuition is that if closer trade relationships are characterized by tighter links in the chain of production, ‡uctuations in one economy should be transmitted more to the other. 1 Recent papers that have con…rmed this …nding are Clark & Van Wincoop (2001) and Baxter & Kouparitsas (2005) .
2 Indeed, Ng (2007) …nds that direct measures of bilateral vertical specialization are related to increased business cycle correlation, and that intra-industry trade plays no signi…cant role once vertical specialization is taken into account. In addition, Di Giovanni & Levchenko (2008) , using cross-country industry-level data,
The main innovation of our work is to introduce producer heterogeneity with two stages of production into an international business cycle model along the lines of Backus et al. (1994) .
In this respect, our model is similar to Yi (2003) and (2009), extended to an environment with aggregate uncertainty. In each stage, the degree of specialization by each country is endogenously determined. As a result, each country requires inputs from the other to produce …nal output. Since this link is stronger when countries trade a wider range of goods, this vertical specialization provides a potential mechanism for the model to generate increased business cycle correlation with higher trade.
We …rst consider a model with perfect competition, as in the Ricardian model of Eaton & Kortum (2002) . Qualitatively, this model generates an increase in GDP correlation with higher trade intensity, but falls short quantitatively compared to the data. There are two …ndings that explain this result: one analytical, and one numerical. The analytical …nding is that, when standard national income accounting methods are used to construct real GDP, ‡uctuations in measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in each country depend only on domestic shocks, to a …rst-order approximation. Hence, trade links do not transmit technology shocks across countries directly into measured productivity. Changes in real GDP, though, are accounted for by changes in TFP as well as changes in factor inputs; the numerical …nding is that the correlation across countries of changes in inputs is not su¢ cient to generate substantial correlation in real GDP, nor a signi…cant dependence of business cycle correlation on trade intensity.
These results allow us to identify the features of the model that lead standard accounting methods to understate the impact of trade on international business cycle transmission. Most …nd that the correlation of output in industries with vertical production linkages is more sensitive to trade. notable of these features is the fact that perfect competition prevents e¢ ciency di¤erences across producers from translating into di¤erences in measured productivity. To address this issue, we introduce imperfect competition following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003) , allowing for markups to vary across producers with di¤erent e¢ ciency. In this model, e¢ ciency di¤erences do translate into measured productivity di¤erences, and we …nd that this new channel gives the model the potential to generate cross-country correlations in measured TFP, and thus real GDP, that increase with trade intensity. This paper is most closely related to recent papers that attempt to account for the tradecomovement relationship. Burstein, Kurz & Tesar (2008) show that allowing for production sharing among countries can deliver tighter business cycle synchronization. 3 Our results suggest that for looking at real GDP, relaxing key assumptions such as constant elasticity of substitution in preferences and perfect competition could be crucial for changing the implications of trade intensity for business cycle behavior. Drozd & Nosal (2008) deviate from the standard neoclassical framework and address the link between trade and comovement in a model featuring a low short-run price elasticity of trade coexisting with a high long-run price elasticity. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II. lays out our model and section III.
discusses the structure of vertical specialization. Section IV. discusses the dynamics of real GDP and measured productivity. Section V. reviews some data on vertical specialization and links various measures to our model. Section VI. describes our numerical experiments with perfect competition, and Section VII. discusses the extension with imperfect competition and variable markups. Section VIII. concludes.
II. Setup of the Model
Goods are produced in two stages with the second stage of production (production of "…nal goods") using goods produced in the …rst stage ("intermediate goods"). The presence of
Ricardian comparative advantage, which we model as in Eaton & Kortum (2002) , leads countries to endogenously specialize across a continuum of goods in each stage.
The time horizon is in…nite and discrete, and periods are indexed by t = 0; 1; : : : . In each country, there are two sectors of production: a tradeable sector and a nontradeable sector.
There is a continuum of measure one of goods in both stages of tradeable production. To economize on notation, except where noted below, we index both intermediate and …nal goods in the tradeable sector by !, although an intermediate good labelled ! and a …nal good labelled ! are distinct commodities. We use subscripts to refer to stages of production, s = 1; 2, and time periods, and we use superscripts to refer to countries, i; j = 1; 2. When a variable has a double superscript, the …rst index refers to the source country and the second refers to the destination.
Production of Tradeable Goods
Each …rst-stage intermediate input ! can be produced in country i using a constant returns to scale technology combining physical capital and labor with e¢ ciency denoted by
1t is a country-speci…c time-varying productivity shock common to all intermediate goods producers in country i, and z i 1 (!) is a good-speci…c e¢ ciency that is constant over time.
Output of each intermediate good ! produced by country i is given by:
where k i 1t (!) and`i 1t (!) denote capital and labor, respectively, used in the production of good !, and 2 (0; 1).
The minimum unit cost of producing intermediate good ! in country i is:
where q i 1t is the cost of the input bundle scaled by aggregate productivity in the …rst stage:
Here, w i t denotes the wage and r i t is the rental rate of capital in country i.
Purchasers of intermediate goods in each country buy each good from the source country that o¤ers the lowest price after accounting for trade costs. We adopt the standard "iceberg" cost formulation, so that delivering one unit of any stage-s good from country i to country j requires shipping 1. Therefore, the price at which country j purchases intermediate good ! is given by:
The technology for producing output of …nal good ! is:
where k i 2t (!), and`i 2t (!) denote capital and labor used in the production of …nal good !, A i 2t and z i 2 (!) are time-varying and good-speci…c e¢ ciency for …nal goods, respectively, and 
where the subscript T distinguishes variables for the tradeable sector from corresponding variables for the nontradeable sector, discussed below.
The unit cost of production for …nal good ! is given by
where
5 Unless otherwise noted, integration is over the entire set of goods in the relevant stage of production.
Here, the term P i 1t denotes the price for the intermediate goods bundle:
Similar to …rst-stage goods, …nal goods are also purchased in each country from the source o¤ering the lowest price adjusted for trade costs. Thus, the price of …nal good ! in country j is:
Final goods are purchased by households to form composite consumption and investment of tradeable goods, which we denote
Therefore, the price index for …nal tradeable goods has the same form as (9), and is given by:
In the next section, we impose further structure on the distribution of good-speci…c e¢ ciencies, and derive how these assumptions shape the pattern of trade and the prices paid for goods in each country.
Technology structure for tradeable goods
We follow the probabilistic representation of Eaton & Kortum (2002) for good-speci…c e¢ -ciencies. For each country i, stage s, and good !, z i s (!) is drawn from a Fréchet distribution with cumulative distribution function:
where T i s > 0 and > 1. E¢ ciency draws are independent across goods, stages, and countries. The probability that a particular stage-s good ! can be produced in country i with e¢ ciency less than or equal to z is given by F i s (z). Since draws are independent across the continuum of goods, F i s (z) also denotes the fraction of stage-s goods that country i is able to produce with e¢ ciency at most z.
As in Eaton & Kortum (2002) , the cross country di¤erences in T is relatively more productive in intermediate inputs.
As Eaton & Kortum (2002) show, the distribution of prices of stage-1 goods that country
s . The probability that country j is able to purchase a certain good at price below p is the probability that either source country o¤ers country j a price below p, that is, the probability that min q ij st ; q jj st p.
Therefore, the overall distribution of prices of stage-s goods available in country j is
Since the only dimension of heterogeneity across goods in a given stage is e¢ ciency, we can aggregate across goods by aggregating across e¢ ciency levels or across prices. With this transformation, the price index for stage-s goods can be written as (P
which, using the distributions (14) is:
where is the Gamma function, (a) =
The probability that country j buys a certain good from country i, or alternatively the fraction of goods that country j buys from country i, is given by the probability that
As Eaton & Kortum (2002) show, this is equal to:
In addition, because the distribution of stage-s goods actually purchased by country j from country i is equal to the overall price distribution G j st , the fraction ij st of goods purchased from country i is also equal to the fraction of country j's total expenditures on stage-s goods that it spends on goods from country i.
Production of nontradeable goods
Each country also produces a nontradeable good according to the following technology:
where 
The unit cost of producing nontradeable goods is
Households
Each country is populated by an in…nitely-lived representative household which values sequences of consumption of tradeable …nal goods, consumption of nontradeable goods, and leisure, according to the following preferences:
where L denotes the fraction of time devoted to labor supplied in domestic production, C T denotes the tradeable composite consumption de…ned in (11) and C N denotes consumption of nontradeable goods. E denotes the expectation over the entire time horizon, and 2 (0; 1)
is the household's discount factor. The parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the fraction of aggregate expenditure on tradeable goods and " > 0 determines the household's elasticity of substitution across dates and states of the world.
The household also purchases tradeable and nontradeable investment goods, X 
where is the depreciation rate of capital and the fraction of investment expenditures are spent on tradeable goods. We assume that the household spends a constant share of income on nontradeable consumption and nontradeable investment to avoid needing excessively high transportation costs to generate realistic levels of trade.
The household receives income from selling labor services and renting capital to …rms.
We assume that countries do not trade …nancial assets -that is, trade in goods is balanced in each period -so the total expenditure of each country is constrained by its income:
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Let i st denote the set of stage-s goods which country i produces. We de…ne total capital stocks and labor in each country i = 1; 2 and in each tradeable stage s = 1; 2 as
At each date t, the total supply of capital and labor by households equals the demand from producers,
We use the expenditure shares de…ned in (17) to write aggregated market clearing conditions for goods in each stage and sector. Country i's expenditure on goods from country j equal a fraction ji st for stage-s goods. Since producers are perfectly competitive, the income paid to factors in the …rst stage equals the value of …rst-stage production in country i, and the income paid to factors in production of …nal goods equals a fraction of the value of …nal goods production. Therefore, for tradeable goods,
, and for nontradeable goods,
An equilibrium consists of stochastic processes for prices and quantities such that households'utility is maximized subject to (21) and (22), producers'costs are minimized, and the market clearing conditions for goods and factor inputs are satis…ed each period. We solve for an equilibrium in terms of consumption, investment, and intermediate input expenditures, capital and labor supplies, factor prices, and composite price indices, with quantities aggregated across the continuum of goods in the case of the two tradeable stages. We use a standard linear approximation method to solve for recursive decision rules in the neighborhood of the model's deterministic steady state.
7

III. Vertical Specialization Structure
We now brie ‡y compare the vertical specialization structure in our model to related ways of specifying this feature. We will focus our comparison on three recent contributions, Eaton & Kortum (2002), Burstein et al. (2008), and Yi (2009 combined with a …xed elasticity of substitution into a …nal good. However, the pattern of specialization is …xed in that countries do not specialize in the production of the goods in which they are most e¢ cient.
An alternative model with endogenous specialization is the one used in Yi (2003) and (2009) 
IV. Real GDP and Productivity in the Model
Compared to standard international business cycle models, our model contains additional potential channels of international transmission of ‡uctuations through trade. The presence of vertical specialization links countries' production processes, and the degree of specialization increases with trade intensity, so that countries that trade more have production processes that are more closely linked.
In standard international business cycle models in which all value-added is created in a single stage of production, technology shocks are transmitted across countries through the imperfect substitutability of goods: a country that receives a favorable shock demands more imports as well as domestic goods for consumption and investment, so its trading partner produces more. In our model, there is an additional e¤ect from having two stages of production: a country with a favorable shock o¤ers its trading partner lower prices for intermediate inputs, which makes production of …nal goods more e¢ cient, as the same amount of output can be produced with lower input expenditures. If the degree of vertical specialization increases with trade intensity, then there is more potential for a country to bene…t from foreign technology improvements in this way. Additionally, due to endogenous specialization, countries produce the goods in which they are most e¢ cient, so that foreign productivity improvements cause increased specialization into more e¢ ciently produced goods at home.
To assess the potential impact of these mechanisms on business cycle comovement, we need to construct a measure of real value added, or GDP. In order to compare the model's predictions to data, we construct a measure of real GDP from the model's output comparable with standard national accounting methods. In our model, since there is a continuum of goods and changing trade patterns, we have some choice regarding how to compute aggregate quantities. Since our results depend heavily on the method of GDP measurement, we dwell on this point a bit here: in the …rst subsection below, we explain the de…nitions of aggregate statistics we use, and in the second subsection, we derive some of the implications of our choices for ‡uctuations in aggregate productivity.
National Accounts Statistics in the Model
We construct an analogue of real GDP, that is, GDP measured in base period prices, as reported in actual data by national statistical agencies. In order to do this in a way that is as close as possible to the methods used by these agencies, we follow the recommendations in the UN's System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93).
We de…ne nominal GDP at current prices as aggregate value-added, or the di¤erence between the total value of gross output less total expenditures on intermediate inputs. Gross output at current producer prices is given by:
and expenditure on intermediate inputs, valued at purchaser prices, is given by:
GDP at current prices is then
To construct real GDP as measured in the data, we reconstruct the above formulas using constant, base-period prices for each good. Real gross output is:
whereq i s0 (!) is a base period producer price, de…ned below. Real expenditures on intermediate inputs are:
where p A practical problem that this method raises is that country-speci…c period-0 producer prices,q i s0 (!), are not de…ned for all goods, due to the fact that specialization patterns change in the model. For example, it may be the case that good ! is produced in country 1 in period t, but was not produced by country 1 in period 0; country 1 would have imported the good in period 0. In this case, it is not obvious at what price we should value country 1's output of good ! in period t when calculating real gross output. On the one hand, the SNA 93 recommends (paragraph 16.53) using average price changes of similar products as a proxy for the change in price of a new good between the base period and the current period; adapting this interpretation in our model would mean using country 1's price of selling the good to itself in period 0, q 1 s0 (!). On the other hand, if we use the price at which the good was imported in period 0, then the product account (gross output less intermediate inputs)
is consistent with the expenditure account (consumption plus investment less net exports), because the base period consumer price is unambiguously equal to the import price. We proceed with the latter assumption, but this choice has essentially no e¤ect on our results.
Measured TFP correlation
In Section VI., we perform several numerical experiments to evaluate the extent to which increased trade intensity a¤ects business cycle synchronization in the presence of vertical specialization. In this section, however, we show that, in one important respect, trade in our model does not make countries more correlated: changes in measured TFP, constructed in our model using real GDP as de…ned above, are not linked across countries through international trade. That is, although measured TFP is an endogenous object in our model, there is no endogenous link between TFP across countries, and hence no dependence on trade intensity of the correlation in TFP. When measuring aggregate accounting statistics as in the data, the dynamics of TFP are pinned down by exogenous factors alone. In addition, the intuition behind the result suggests that it holds for a wide class of dynamic models with endogenous specialization and trade in intermediate goods. Without comovement in TFP, our model can produce endogenous comovement in GDP, but to a small degree, as we show in the next section.
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Our result can be stated as follows:
Proposition 1 Let variables with^denote log deviations from the steady state. Measured TFP, de…ned by:
follows, to a …rst order approximation:
A sketch of the proof of this and the next proposition is provided in the appendix. The proposition is related to Hulten (1978) , who showed that, in a multi-sector neoclassical closed economy with intermediate inputs, aggregate TFP evolves as a weighted average of sectoral productivity growth, with the weights given by sectoral gross output shares of GDP.
Equation (32) shows that aggregate TFP in our model behaves exactly as in a three-sector version of the closed economy models that Hulten considers, with only one of the sectors supplying intermediate inputs.
The intuition for this stark result is straightforward, given the assumptions used in aggregating value-added across goods to construct real GDP. First, because we use good-speci…c prices in valuing the output of each producer, e¢ ciency di¤erences across goods do not show up in the value of output: in the presence of perfect competition, a producer with higher e¢ -ciency simply charges a proportionally lower price, so the measured value of output per unit of input does not vary across producers. 10 Bernard et al. (2003) and Gibson (2006) raise the same point regarding the e¤ect of reallocation that occurs in response to trade liberalization in models with heterogeneous producers and monopolistic competition. Second, by using base period prices, the ‡uctuations in the value of income from movements in factor costs and prices do not show up in the computation of real GDP, a point made by Kehoe & Ruhl (2008) . Even with intermediate goods, the gains in e¢ ciency that result from purchasing imported inputs at cheaper prices are removed by valuing inputs at base period prices.
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To show that the accounting method is the reason that foreign productivity shocks do not a¤ect domestic TFP, in the next proposition we show that a welfare-based measure of productivity does capture the e¤ects of foreign productivity shocks through trade.
Proposition 2 De…ne "welfare-based real income" and "welfare-based productivity" as:
Then, for some constant i ,
A welfare-based measure of productivity increases when the share of goods that a country buys from itself, ii st , decreases in either stage. Foreign productivity improvements generate changes in real GDP. Interestingly, the distributions of e¢ ciencies in each stage do not play any role in deriving this result. As long as we look at …rst-order e¤ects, where the goods that switch contribute zero to changes in real GDP, the proof goes through under any speci…cation of the e¢ ciency distributions.
11 Equation (32) shows that, if production technologies are not Cobb-Douglas, TFP correlations could rise with trade intensity if an increase in trade shifts countries'output shares toward sectors that are more correlated. such a decrease in the share of goods purchased domestically. In this sense, the welfare-based productivity measure re ‡ects transmission of productivity shocks across countries.
V. Vertical Specialization and Trade
Before proceeding to our numerical experiments, we review some measures of vertical specialization in the data, and show how to construct corresponding measures in the model.
A commonly cited measure of vertical specialization is the one in Hummels, Ishii & Yi (2001) . The authors de…ne an index of vertical specialization for a given sector as the ratio of imported inputs to gross output. To construct an economywide measure of vertical specialization, they aggregate this index across sectors, weighted by each sector's share of exports, to capture the degree to which imported inputs are important in exporting sectors.
Their measure for country i is then given by: Table 1 . In the next section, we evaluate the ability of versions of our model with and without vertical specialization to generate higher synchronization of business cycles between countries that have higher trade intensity.
VI. Numerical Experiments
We set several parameters to standard values in the international business cycle literature.
We interpret one model period as one quarter, and set the discount factor = 0:99 so that the steady state real interest rate is 4% per year. We set to 0:3, so 30% of value added is paid to capital. The depreciation rate is set to 2:5% per period. The utility parameter is set to 0:34, so that about 1=3 of the total time endowment is supplied as labor in the steady state. We set the share of tradeable output in GDP to match the share of nontradeable expenditures in the model to the share of …nal expenditures on services in US input-output tables, giving = :3.
We assume that the technology shocks are equal across sectors within a country, A innovation with standard deviation " . We set = 0:9 and " = 0:01. Both values are close to those used, for example, by Backus et al. (1994) , and generate average autocorrelation and standard deviation of HP-…ltered TFP in our benchmark experiments of 0:59 and 0:017, respectively. Notably, we do not build any correlation into the shocks to technology across countries or across sectors, so that we isolate the degree to which our model endogenously generates cross-country correlation in measured real GDP.
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The model contains two parameters related to the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. As in Eaton & Kortum (2002) , the role of the parameter in determining the elasticity of trade is concealed by the role of . While governs substi- 13 Adding positive correlation in the exogenous shocks would increase the levels of cross-country correlations, but does not a¤ect their dependence on trade intensity. tutability in the intensive margin -within goods that are continuously traded -governs the heterogeneity across goods, and hence determines the extent to which the extensive margin of trade in new goods responds to variations in technology or trade costs. At the aggregate level, the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods in our model is . As Ruhl (2008) notes, measures of this aggregate elasticity in the data di¤er depending on the source of price variation: measures from time series data give small elasticities of the magnitude typically used in international business cycle models. On the other hand, estimates from cross-section data relating trade patterns to tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers …nd elasticities that are much higher. Since the parameter governs the elasticity in response to both types of price variation in our model, we balance between the two measures by choosing a value of = 3:6 because it is the lowest of the three estimates from Eaton & Kortum (2002) . For the elasticity of substitution that determines the substitution between di¤erent goods, we use the benchmark value of Backus et al. (1994) In the experiments below, we choose the technology parameters T i s and the trade costs ij s to generate di¤erent steady state specialization and international trade patterns. We subse-14 Recent estimates by Broda & Weinstein (2006) place the median value of this elastictity across all sectors to be 2.5 and the average value much higher than that. The model constrains us to set > 1 but raising the elasticity does not substantially alter our results. quently look at the degree of business cycle comovement across these di¤erent patterns.
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Results
We look at various cross-country correlations of H-P …ltered variables in di¤erent versions of the model. In addition to real GDP and TFP, we also look at the correlations between countries of welfare-based real income,Ỹ i ; aggregate labor supply; real consumption expenditures at base period prices,
and real value added in di¤erent stages of production:
In light of Proposition 2, we show the alternative income measure,Ỹ , to get a sense of how large the e¤ects of increases in trade and vertical specialization are on comovement, even though it does not appear in traditional national accounting statistics. We …rst look at a version of the model with no vertical specialization which we denote as the benchmark. The goal is to subsequently introduce di¤erent experiments where vertical specialization arises for di¤erent reasons and compare the properties of these versions of the model with the benchmark. The left half of Table 2 shows statistics for the benchmark 15 In an appendix available online, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity parameters and , and the correlation of shocks " In Table 3 we show statistics for two variations of our model with 15% trade intensity, in which trade costs di¤er across stages of production. The column labelled "Low VS"
16 While the ij 1 fractions in our model results come close to the data for, for example, the US (compare to 1 ii 1 in Table 1 ), the V S measures our model predicts are much smaller than in the data. This suggests that sectoral di¤erences that are emphasized by the V S measure of Hummels et al. (2001) may be important. has relatively high trade costs for …rst stage goods, so that trade intensity in these goods is dampened, while the column labelled "High VS" has relatively low trade costs for …rst stage goods. The results indicate that a higher degree of vertical specialization does not signi…cantly a¤ect the business cycle correlations we consider if countries are symmetric. Finally, in Table 4 we consider a case in which countries are asymmetric: we choose the T i s terms so that country 1 has a comparative advantage in the production of stage 1 goods, while country 2 has a comparative advantage in stage 2 goods, and both countries have the same steady state GDP. In the left column, labeled "low specialization", the degree of comparative advantage is smaller than in the right column, labeled "high specialization", so that the vertical specialization measure for country 2 is larger, and for country 1 is smaller, in the right column. We see again that most of the cross-country correlations change little across these cases. The exception is the correlation of real value added across countries in di¤erent stages: while the correlation of real value added in the sector in which each country specializes is only .02 in the low specialization case, this correlation increases to .13 in the high specialization case. The extent to which countries are negatively correlated in the sectors in which they do not have comparative advantage increases as well. The negative change slightly outweighs the positive change here, so that even though it applies to sectors that are small in each country, the overall e¤ect is that the correlation of aggregate real GDP is similar under low specialization or high specialization.
In these results, we have shown that several versions of our model can generate moderate increases in business cycle comovement with increases in trade intensity. However, for the cases we have considered here, these increases are small, and the addition of vertical specialization does not contribute signi…cantly to magnifying them. While asymmetric countries in our model clearly do display the tight links across sectors that vertical specialization implies, additional mechanisms would be needed to translate these links to aggregate real GDP and measured TFP. In the next section, we examine one such mechanism.
VII. An Extension with Imperfect Competition
Having established that our model with perfect competition does not provide a link between trade and TFP correlations, we follow Bernard et al. (2003) by introducing in our model a sort of imperfect competition that breaks the link between prices and producers'e¢ ciencies, and show that it has the potential to link trade intensity to correlations in measured TFP, as well as real GDP.
We modify the structure of our model as follows: in each country, there are a large number of potential producers of each good, and country i's k'th most e¢ cient producer of good ! in stage s has e¢ ciency z i ks (!). The lowest cost among producers in both countries of delivering good ! to country j is then p Under Bertrand competition, each good is sold in a country by the producer with the lowest-cost of selling there, but this producer charges a price equal to either the second best producer's marginal cost or a …xed markup over its own marginal cost, whichever is smaller. The second lowest cost is p min 2 refers to the second smallest. Therefore, the price charged for good ! in country j is
where m = =( 1) is the monopolistic markup. In this model, we assume that > 1, so that the monopolistic markup is positive.
The only relevant e¢ ciencies for determining prices and production patterns are z i 1s (!) and z i 2s (!). We assume that these e¢ ciencies are jointly distributed according to the analogue of the Fréchet distribution in Bernard et al. (2003) : the joint probability that z i 1s (!)
The marginal distribution of z 1 is still given by (13), so the parameters T i s and play the same role as in the previous setup. Following the derivations in Bernard et al. (2003) , the CES price indices for each stage are:
where j st and the trade shares ij st are de…ned in the same way as in (15) and (17).
Finally, the model with Bertrand competition di¤ers in that producers earn pro…ts, so consumers'budget constraints are modi…ed to include pro…ts and the market clearing conditions are modi…ed. As Bernard et al. (2003) show, aggregate pro…ts in each stage are a fraction 1= (1 + ) of total revenues, so that the market clearing conditions for each stage of tradable goods can be written:
In the case of Bertrand competition, e¢ ciency does not map one-to-one to prices, as evident in (38). In light of the discussion in Section IV., this disconnection gives the model more potential to generate cross-country correlation in measured TFP and real GDP. 17 Table   5 displays the analogues of the results in Table 2 for this extension of the model. As we go from 3% to 15% trade intensity, the correlation of real GDP increases from .01 to .06 in the one stage benchmark, and from .04 to .09 in the vertical specialization model. The slope of the GDP correlation in the vertical specialization model is 0.031, about one third of the slope estimated in the data in Kose & Yi (2006) . This increase is also seen in the correlation of measured TFP, which increases from .02 to to .06 in the one stage model, and from .04 to .10 in the vertical model. The latter result was qualitatively missing in the model with perfect competition. In the vertical specialization model with imperfect competition, the implied slope of the TFP correlation and trade relationship is 0.037, about 40% of the slope that Kose & Yi (2006) estimate in the data, which is 0.089. Thus, the model with imperfect competition, through its e¤ects on the measurement of real GDP, qualitatively changes the way that measured TFP depends on trade in our model, and has the potential to quantitatively change the relationship between trade intensity and GDP correlations. An extension of this setup to a model with more than two countries, calibrated to match bilateral trade shares, would be needed to provide a better quantitative evaluation of this mechanism's ability, combined with endogenous specialization, to solve the trade-comovement puzzle. 17 With imperfect competition, the expressions we derived above for real GDP are no longer valid, and analogous expressions are much more intractable. To compute aggregate statistics, we draw e¢ ciencies for one hundred thousand goods, compute the relevant variables for producers of each good every period, and calculate aggregates at base-period prices as sample averages.
VIII. Conclusion
We have developed a model vertical specialization in international trade in a setting with aggregate ‡uctuations. We asked whether this framework can account for the trade comovement puzzle identi…ed by (2006) . While the framework we develop does not resolve the puzzle, our work helps to take important steps in understanding the reasons behind its persistence under di¤erent modeling frameworks: we prove that with perfect competition, measured TFP does not depend on trade or vertical specialization intensity.
While vertical specialization as we have speci…ed it provides an intuitive reason for countries that trade more to be more correlated, additional mechanisms are needed to account for the extent to which this channel a¤ects the behavior of measured business cycle statistics. Our preliminary results from a model with variable markups indicate that this feature, combined with vertical specialization, is a promising avenue for further exploration to link trade and TFP ‡uctuations. 
The derivations are lengthy, but some intuition is provided in the text and the technical details are in an online appendix. By using the fact that in the steady state,
, we arrive at the conclusion that
The de…nition ofÂ 
B Appendix
Model expressions for real GDP
Aggregate Gross Output
We use equation (29) and the fact that the value of gross output of each good evaluated at current prices is equal to the value of payments to inputs to write:
Each set of the form . Imposing this partition and rearranging terms gives: (6) and (23): 
The di¤erence between (A.1) and the expression for gross output under the alternative base-period price rule is that the last two terms in (A.1) would be zero. As shown in the next subsection, these two terms are zero to a …rst order approximation.
Aggregate Expenditures on Intermediate Inputs
In equation (30), we need to split up the range of goods purchased by country i depending on the pattern of specialization both in the current period, and in the base period. We need to know from which country each good was bought in each period, to determine the base period price and the current period quantity purchased. Let ji 1t denote the set of goods that country i purchases from country j in period t. Then, for example, the set of goods which country i buys from home in period t but imported in period 0 is ii 1t \ ji 10 , so (30) can be written: We use the de…nitions of prices from (2) and (4) and the CES demand function for each good to write: .
